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How Audit Committees should Work 
by A.A. SOMMER, JR./Chairman, SEC Advisory Committee on Corporate Disclosure 
II has been suggested thai the ac-
counting portions of the Foreign Cor-
rupt Practices Act represent one of the 
most massive and widespread intru-
sions of the government into the 
process of corporate governance that 
has yet occurred. Thai may be a flight 
overstatement, but there is no ques-
tion that it represents a new tool in the 
hands of the SEC. That the SEC is going 
to utilize these powers is obvious. 
Wha t is of concern to everyone in-
volved in the process of corporate 
governance is what will be required as 
a result of these new demands. And 
among those people, obviously, are 
corporate directors. 
What are the concerns of directors? 
Since I am on two audit committees 
myself, I believe I have more than a 
passing interest in the subject. 
There is no question that everyone 
involved in the corporate community 
has a responsibility for maintaining 
accurate information concerning a 
firm's assets and operations. The chief 
executive officer has it. The board of 
directors has it. And the auditors have 
a responsibility, as well. 
However, it seems to me that the 
literature being developed for direc-
tors has been very abstract, much too 
general, and grossly unrealistic. W e 
need a clear, simple, more precise 
answer to what one can reasonably 
expect from a board of directors in 
regard to internal controls. 
Let me try to put those statements 
into some sort of perspective, First, 
many are losing sight these days of the 
fact that internal controls constitute 
on ly o n e of many p rob l ems that 
directors and management must deal 
with. Interna) controls, one might even 
say, are not a director's major respon-
sibility. His major responsibility, in my 
eyes, is to monitor the management of 
the company—to make sure that the 
company functions in an effective, 
economic fashion, producing goods 
and services and earning a profit. 
The second proposition thai I would 
spotlight is that there are general rules 
that govern the manner in which cor-
porate directors must meet their com-
mitments; and the rules with regard to 
internal controls are no different than 
those with regard to other areas of 
directorial responsibility. Directors 
must be apprised of how to fulfill these 
newly defined responsibilities. And 
they must be guided by those who are 
in the best position to do so—namely, 
outside counsel, outside auditors, and 
to some extent the internal audit staff 
and the chief financial officer 
My final proposition is that in this 
day, when there is considerable pres-
sure upon corporations to include on 
their boards people who may not have 
financial sophistication, the problem 
of internal controls should be ex-
plained to the board—and even to the 
audit committee—in very basic, very 
simple terms. 
The Board's Role 
Now, let's relate the general rules that 
govern directors to this whole prob-
lem of records and controls. Most 
corporation laws today speak of the 
board of directors as managing the 
corporat ion. But everybody knows 
that that doesn't mean what it says. 
What it really means is that they are 
there to monitor management. They 
are to review what management is 
doing. They are in some areas to direct 
management. But they are not to be 
involved in the day-to-day running of 
the company, nor in the day-to-day 
implementat ion of internal control 
systems. Specifically, they should par-
ticipate in developing the objectives of 
the corporation, they should help de-
termine whether or not the objectives 
are reasonable, and they should re-
view whether or not those objectives 
are being met. 
There is much involved in this, of 
course. There is the accountability of 
the corporation to its shareholders, to 
its employees, to the SEC, and to the 
communities in which it operates. The 
shareholders, of course, are at the core 
of this entire process. They are the 
ones whose money is at stake, and 
they are the principal body to whom 
accountability must be directed. 
Now, how does the monitoring by 
directors impact the problem of inter-
nal controls? I have read some litera-
ture that suggests that the outside 
directors, and more particularly the 
audit committee, should become in-
volved in the day-to-day implementa-
tion of internal controls. I would hope 
that is not the law. It is management's 
responsibility to establish and operate 
the internal control system, just as it is 
management's role to develop man-
ufacturing facilities and a sales capaci-
ty. 1 he outside director's responsibility 
is to oversee this, which includes a 
monitoring responsibility for the fi-
nancial side of the business. And a part 
of that financial side, the reporting side 
of the business, involves the integrity 
of internal controls. 
Now, what does that mean? What 
do directors actually have to do? I'm 





to insure that directors will be above 
criticism for the manner in which they 
perform this monitoring function. But I 
will surges! to you some of the things 
that they should do. 
First of all, the concept of internal 
controls may need to be handled al-
most at the level of a Dick and Jane 
presentation. This may be offensive to 
some people who are quite familiar 
with controls. But the fact is that today 
there is a desire on the part of many 
companies to appoint to the board of 
directors people whose disciplines are 
not financial disciplines, not even 
business disciplines. 
For example, these directors should 
understand whether or not the partic-
ular company has a system; for there is 
a difference between "internal con-
trols" and "a system of internal con-
trols." A "system of internal controls" 
implies a clear and complete set of 
reporting and authorization responsi-
bilities. The system will generally be 
committed to writing, and there will be 
people responsible for updating it. It 
will be organized. There will be ac-
countability within the system, and the 
pieces will fit together. 
Second, the directors ought to know 
who has the ultimate operating re-
sponsibility for the internal control 
system and how he conceives of his 
responsibility. How well can he articu-
late what it is he thinks his job is? 
The directors, unless the duty is to 
be delegated to the audit committee, 
must also determine whether or not 
the person responsible for internal 
controls is competent. Is he a leader? 
Is he able, for example, to pick skilled 
people? 
Ano the r i tem to de t e rm ine is 
whether or not there is adequate staff-
ing. That is a serious problem today. 1 
am on the boards of companies that 
are experiencing great difficulty— 
largely due to the introduction of the 
Foreign Corrupt Practices Act-in hir-
ing people for their internal auditing 
staffs. There is fierce competition for 
people that have competence in this 
area. 
What is the responsibility of direc-
tors in their internal control monitoring 
function? Briefly, they must exercise 
due care, which means that they must 
conduct themselves in the fashion in 
which an ordinarily prudent man 
would conduct himself in handling his 
own affairs. Those who are not lawyers 
may think this is a terribly general 
standard, but every effort thai I know 
of to flesh it out in a meaningful way 
has foundered. Such efforts have 
ended up with either an additional 
four or five general rules or rules so 
particular that they become ridiculous. 
In any event, no director can guaran-
tee that an internal controls system is 
going to work, or that the corpora-
tion's conduct is in compliance with 
the law, for that is not the standard 
against which a director is to be mea-
sured. 
The Audit Committee's Role 
Since it has become increasingly com-
mon to delegate certain board re-
sponsibilities to one committee or an-
other, the audit committee has come 
into sharp focus. My own opinion is 
that boards are tempted to delegate 
loo much responsibility to audit com-
mittees. Indeed, there is a great deal of 
controversy today about whether or 
not a person on an audit committee 
assumes greater responsibilities and 
must conform to higher standards than 
non-committee directors. I wou ld 
suggest that the standard is not dif-
ferent, but that there is a difference in 
the weight of responsibility. 
An audit committee member re-
ceives greater insight into certain 
problems of a company than do other 
directors, and he must utilize that 
knowledge in carrying out his duties 
on the audit committee. That's com-
mon sense. Anybody who has a fidu-
ciary responsibility must use the 
knowledge that he gains, as well as the 
knowledge that he brings to the task, in 
carrying out his responsibilities. 
What about the duties of the non-
committee member? Can he rely upon 
the audit committee? Yes, he can, as 
long as he has used reasonable care in 
the selection of the people who are on 
the audit committee, and as long as he 
supervises them in a reasonable fash-
ion. If he exercises such care, but 
nevertheless the audit committee acts 
irresponsibly, he is not held responsi-
ble. But obviously, if the audit com-
mittee's lack of responsibility be-
comes a subject of litigation, there is 
going to be a spotlight on the care 
which the non-committee members 
did exercise. 
W h y would the board delegate the 
monitoring of internal controls to the 
audit committee, if it is so important? 
There are several reasons. O n e of 
them is simply the economy of time. 
Directors today in complex compa-
nies cannot be expected to familiarize 
themselves with all facets of a com-
pany's business. The result has been 
that large companies like General 
Motors and General Electric have de-
veloped a rather sophisticated com-
mittee system that fosters a delegation 
of responsibilities. This is not to sug-
gest that the directors not on those 
committees can be indifferent to the 
matters before those committees, but 
it does mean that they are not expect-
ed to have as great a knowledge in the 
areas in which those committees are 
operating. If a director of General 
Motors had to become familiar with 
every facet of the company's business, 
for example, it would obviously be a 
far more demanding job than it pres-
ently is, and it might be correspond-
ingly more difficult to secure high cali-
ber people to serve in that role. 
Another reason the board delegates 
responsibility to an audit committee is 
that it provides an opportunity to uti-
lize best the skills and experience of 
certain people who are members of 
the board. 1 here is a growing tendency 
to draw upon retired accountants as 
directors, for example. They make, in 
my estimation, absolutely superb 
members of audit committees, be-
cause, among other things, they know 
what internal controls are. 
Indeed, when a board selects the 
members of an audit committee, it 
should tilt in the direction of people 
who have such financial sophistica-
tion. One might wonder whether or 
not this is a good policy. Shouldn't 
there be a rotation policy on commit-
tees? Yes, but 1 think that the integrity 
of the financial reporting process 
should require that the people who 
have the particular competence be the 
ones to serve on that committee. 
That audit committees consist only 
of independent directors is a very de-
sirable thing. It's a lot easier for an 
audit commit tee without members 
from management to sit down with the 
internal auditor and the outside ac-
countant and say: Is anybody in man-
agement interfering with you? Is any-
body pulling back on you? Are you 
sufficiently staffed? Have you run into 
trouble with budgetary considera-
tions? Do you feel you're getting 
enough money? 
Now, what should the audit com-
mittee of the board do? First of all, it 
should be recognized that it is going to 
be dependent upon members of the 
management team. Its members can-
not go down into the bowels of the 
corporation and ferret out deficiencies 
in the internal reporting system. 1 think 
it's unreasonable to expect them to do 
that. W h o m do they rely upon? I think 
they largely rely upon the internal au-
ditor, and this is why 1 have placed so 
much emphasis on gelling to know 
him and having confidence in his abili-
ty and his integrity. Of course, the audit 
committee must rely as well on the 
external auditor, who has the responsi-
bility of reporting to management any 
deficiency in controls that is discov-
ered in the course of the audit. Ob-
viously, the audit committee should be 
apprised of anything that is found at 
that time. Indeed, the external auditor 
should be interrogated regularly by the 
audit committee—or the board, if there 
is no audit committee—concerning 
what he has found. 
As I mentioned, the board mem-
bers, and especially audit committee 
members, should understand what in-
ternal control is ait about. They should 
know what system exists in the com-
pany and be familiar with it. They 
should determine if there is a manual 
on internal controls. Is it kept up to 
date? And does the system reflect 
problems that have recently emerged? 
Is It a static system or is it updated? 
How long has it existed, and when was 
it last reviewed? And finally, how com-
petent are the people who run it? 
How does an audit committee actu-
ally monitor the fiscal activities of a 
company? First, I believe the internal 
auditor should report to the commit-
tee as well as to the chief executive 
officer. Suggestions have been made 
that he should report only to the audit 
committee, I think that is a mistake, 
because the C E O is responsible, too, 
for an internal control system. 
Incidentally, at one company I am 
acquainted with the audit committee 
reviews the bonus of the head of 
internal auditing. In fact, it also reviews 
his entire compensation, so that man-
agement can place no pressure upon 
him through these means. 
Either the audit committee or the 
board- for simplicity's sake, let me 
refer only to the audit committee-
should meet periodically with the in-
ternal auditor. In a sizeable company, 
there should probably be two or three 
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meetings a year. In addition, there 
ought to be periodic reports from the 
internal auditor concerning what his 
team is doing-what audits they are 
conducting internally, what divisions 
they have been to, what problems they 
have identified. 
Shortly after the Foreign Corrupt 
Practices Act was enacted, I received a 
report from the internal auditor of one 
of the companies on whose board I 
serve. In several places, it spoke of 
serious deficiencies in the controls of 
this division or that operation. I called 
the auditor up, and I suggested that 
while that kind of language was ap-
propriate in private meetings, I cer-
tainly didn't want to see it in his report, 
if such documents with such language 
ever came into the possession of cer-
tain people in the government, we 
would have a problem. What he really 
meant, I must add, was not that there 
were serious deficiencies in the sense 
in which you and I would understand 
it, but that there were problems that 
had to be dealt with. 
Wha t about the external auditor? 
Clearly, matters should also be re-
viewed with him periodically. How 
often would depend upon the size of 
the company, the complexity of its 
internal controls, and the letter that the 
external auditors prepare and submit 
to management with regard to internal 
controls and oilier matters. 
it is important that the audit com-
mittee follow up whatever recom-
menda t i ons the external audi tor 
makes concerning the strengthening 
of internal controls. On the boards I 
serve, we do this systematically. W e go 
over recommendations item by item 
after the receipt of a letter, and we 
determine whether there has been 
compliance. If there appears to be 
some sort of an impasse among the 
internal auditor and his people, the 
external auditor, and management, we 
explore the situation, try to ascertain 
where the merit lies, and discuss how 
the various parties are going to resolve 
the issue. 
In some cases, of course, it simply is 
not practical to implement suggestions 
with regard to internal controls. Since 
the balancing of costs and benefits is a 
management responsibility, 1 think that 
an audit committee should generally 
heed management in such situations. 
Of course, one of the things that an 
audit committee should do is see to it 
that the internal control function is 
adequately staffed. 1 know of one in-
stance in which the audit committee 
chairman went to the CEO, when he 
learned that the budget of the internal 
control function had been cut in ac-
cordance with a general cost cutting 
program, and said, in effect, "You can't 
do it. We're not going to let you cut 
back this function, particularly when 
internal controls are as sensitive a 
topic as they now are." 
The audit committee should discuss 
with the internal control people the 
frequency with which they do internal 
audits at various divisions of the com-
pany. On one audit committee on 
which I serve, the chief financial officer 
of a very large company has been 
steadily pressing for a faster cycle than 
is current, and 1 think it is going to 
happen. 
I have attempted here to indicate 
the methods that the board and the 
audit committee can use to monitor a 
company's internal controls. It is not 
intended as a checklist. Briefly, the 
concept of internal controls must be 
communica ted to board members 
today at a very basic level. The capa-
bility of the person in charge of inter-
nal controls—and his staff-must then 
be evaluated by the board. Whi le the 
audit committee may have direct re-
sponsibility for overseeing the internal 
controls, all board members should 
exercise due care both in the selection 
of the committee members and in 
reviewing the work of the committee. 
It is also desirable that these audit 
committee members be independent 
directors, not part of the management 
team. "I he audit committee is going to 
be dependent on the internal auditor, 
in any event, for much of the informa-
tion it seeks. The internal auditor 
should report to the committee as well 
as to the CEO. The external auditor will 
also assist the audit commi t t ee in 
overseeing internal controls. 
The last major point is that an audit 
committee report should be present-
ed at every board meeting. Its chair-
man should report the current status of 
internal controls. If nothing meaning-
ful has come to the committee's at-
tention since the last board meeting, it 
may have no report. In this fashion. 
board members not on the audit com-
mittee can carry out their monitoring 
responsibilities required by the Foreign 
Corrupt Practices Act. 
A. A. Sommer, Jr., a partner in the 
Washington, D.C. law firm of Wilmer, 
Cutler & Pickering, was Commissioner 
of the Securities and Exchange Com-
mission from 1973 to 1976. 
Who Is Responsible to the Audit Committee? 
by W. DONALD GEORCEN/Vice Chairman. Board of Directors, louche Ross 
I he primary responsibility for devel-
oping, implementing, and monitoring 
a system of internal controls lies with 
management. Many companies have 
formed an internal audit function to 
act as a management surrogate in mon-
itoring compliance. In other words, 
they have created a vehicle to see if 
their rules are being followed. 
That is looking at it from the man-
agement level. W h e n you are looking 
at it f rom the board level, in the 
broadest corporate sense, the internal 
audit function becomes part of the 
internal contro l system. Then, w h o 
should be the surrogate of the audit 
committee or the board? Mr, Sommer 
would say primarily the internal audi-
tor, and I think w e might have a small 
disagreement on that particular point. 
W e at Touche Ross say the principal 
surrogate for the audit commi t t ee 
should be the external auditor. He 
should be the one that gathers and 
evaluates evidence of what the com-
pany and the company's internal audi-
tor have done. And the external audi-
tor should be the one to present this 
evidence to the audit committee—with 
an evaluation and appropriate recom-
mendations. 
I like to draw the analogy that the 
external auditor serves as the diagnos-
tician. You go to a doctor, who per-
forms an examination, and he says, I 
think you should come in for some 
elective surgery. And he offers the 
reasons for it. But it is you w h o evalu-
ate the reasons—you may even get a 
different opinion—and it is you w h o 
make the decision. In the area of inter-
nal control, it is the board which makes 
the final decision. 
At Touche Ross, w e also believe 1 hat 
the external auditor has a responsibili-
ty to play more than a passive role in 
evaluating internal controls. That is, 
when the external auditor comes be-
fore the audit committee, he needs to 
do more than simply respond to ques-
tions: yes, no, maybe, never. The ex-
ternal auditor has the responsibility to 
assess whether or not the audit com-
mittee is evaluating the basic systems 
and has been informed about the pri-
mary areas of risk and what the basic 
controls are to protect against those 
risks. 
Now, the fact that the audit commit-
tee should look to the external auditor 
as the primary surrogate does not pre-
clude it from also looking to the inter-
nal auclitor-or any other source that 
the committee believes can provide 
facts that would help in making its 
evaluation. The same analogy holds 
true for the external auditor. Although 
he is primarily responsible to the audit 
commi t t ee , he should also have a 
work ing relat ionship with manage-
ment on a day-to-day basis. 
I make these points in response to 
the furor over some of the remarks by 
S E C Cha i rman Haro ld W i l l i ams , in 
which he discussed to w h o m the in-
ternal auditor should be responsible. I 
think that, in substance, i am in accord 
with what Mr. Sommer has discussed 
here. 
To review, the internal auditor is 
primarily responsible to management; 
it is the vehicle management uses to 
evaluate systems and check for com-
pliance. Whereas the external auditor 
is primarily responsible to the board or 
to the audit committee. In the final 
analysis, however, this distinction isn't 
really that important, since the audit 
committee should have access to in-
ternal audit whenever it desires, and 
management should always have free 
and open contact with the external 
auditor. & 
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